To the extent that the USPTO issues a proliferation of broad and potentially overlapping nanotechnology patents, the development of a nanotechnology patent thicket could impede the licensing process required for further innovation. If the contractor refuses the federal agency ' s request, the agency can grant a license to the applicant itself if " the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention in such fi eld of use " or if " action is necessary to meet requirements for public use specifi ed by Federal regulations and such requirements are not reasonably satisfi ed by the contractor, assignee, or licensees. " Theoretically, the march-in right demonstrates the power of the government to prevent the nonuse of patents in the context of patent hoarding or blocking patents used to stifl e competition. These university-based nanotechnology research centers are in a prime position to secure bids for signifi cant shares of the new funding from the Nanotechnology Act; ultimately, they should have an augmented government license defense in order to carry out incremental and innovative research effectively without becoming unduly encumbered by a nanotechnology patent thicket.
Highlight
Nanotechnology ' s potential impact on worldwide industries has nations around the world investing billions of dollars for research in order to capture a part of the projected trillion dollar market for nanotechnology products in 2010. The current rush to patent nanotechnologies may lead to an overcrowded nanotechnology patent thicket that could deter critical innovation and continued product development in the United States. At this early stage of nanotechnology ' s life cycle, increasing numbers of broad and a Originally published in 53 UCLA L. Rev. 279, 2005 . Reproduced with slight changes and with kind permission by the author and The Regents of the University of California/UCLA Law Review.
potentially overlapping patents are being issued -while few nonexclusive licenses are being offered. Furthermore, the lack of signifi cant case law provides little guidance on proper nanotechnology patent scope and validity, while the decline of legal defenses such as experimental use leaves innovators exposed to potential infringement liability for even the most fundamental of scientifi c research studies. In this Comment, the author proposes that the U.S. government exercises the full extent of its rights under the twentyfi ve year old Bayh-Dole Act and develop the government license defense to create a limited patent compulsory licensing regime for the fruits of federally funded research. The author argues that recipients of the billions of dollars in federal nanotechnology research funds should provide broad, nonexclusive licenses to the privatized patent rights they obtain as a result of public funding. Ultimately, a wellformulated government license defense, which assesses the extent to which an " infringing " act against a federally funded patent falls along a spectrum of fair use, would provide a means for overcoming the innovation-impeding effects of absolute exclusion rights.
Introduction

The Emerging Nanotechnology Patent Thicket
Recognizing that nanotechnology is likely to be the next great technological frontier [1] , United States government offi cials have cited the potential of nanotechnology to transform society and the economy on a scale comparable to the effects of the Industrial Revolution [2] . In order to promote nanotechnology research and development, on December 3, 2003 , President Bush signed the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act (the Nanotechnology Act), which authorizes $ 3.7 billion in funding for federal nanotechnology research and development commencing in 2005 and continuing through 2008 [3] . This newly enacted legislation makes nanotechnology the highest priority technological effort in the United States since the 1960s space race [4] .
In 2003, drafters of the Nanotechnology Act expected the worldwide market for nanotechnology products and services to reach $ 1 trillion by 2015 [5] ; by late 2004, nanotechnology forecasts escalated to as much as $ 1 trillion by 2010 and over $ 2 trillion by 2015 [6] . Nor is the U.S. government alone in recognizing the potential of nanotechnology. The governments of Europe, Japan, China, Canada, and Singapore already have invested billions of dollars in advancing their own nanotechnology programs [7] . Worldwide investments are paying off -nanotechnology products already are in development and estimates in 2004 of nanotechnology ' s overall fi nancial impact ranged from about $ 20 billion to $ 50 billion in revenues [8] . The nanotechnology race is well underway.
The fi rst step in securing the commercial potential of nanotechnology is establishing intellectual property rights to protect innovation. Patents, which essentially provide inventors with a limited monopoly to practice, license, and transfer exclusive rights in technology in exchange for disclosure of novel, useful, and nonobvious innovations, may be the strongest form of available intellectual property protection [9] . In September 2005, the number of issued U.S.patents incorporating the term " nano " [10] in their titles reached 2042, while the term appeared in 96,312 patent descriptions [11] . Also as of September 2005, the term " nano " had been incorporated into an additional 1235 published patent application titles and 42,293 published patent application descriptions [12] . In 2002 alone, there were 526 nanotechnology patents issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Offi ce (USPTO) [13] . Given that the USPTO receives roughly 300,000 patent applications a year, nanotechnology could account for as much as 10 percent of all U.S. patent applications currently under consideration [14] .
Unfortunately, the rush to secure worldwide intellectual property rights in nanotechnology could lead to the development of a " patent thicket. " This term, coined by intellectual property scholars, refers to an overlapping set of patent rights that requires researchers, inventors, and entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize new technologies to obtain licenses from multiple patentees [15] . The development of such a patent thicket could deter further innovation [16] , and the active enforcement by nanotechnology patent holders of their exclusivity rights ultimately could result in the creation of a nanotechnology anticommons -a situation in which a scarce resource becomes prone to underuse because there are too many owners holding the right to exclude others from that resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use [17] . For the purposes of this Comment, the terms " patent thicket " and " anticommons " are used interchangeably to describe the troubling phenomenon that takes place when inventors are unable to compete and innovate effectively due to: the abundance of potentially overbroad and overlapping patents issued by the USPTO; the resistance to broad voluntary licensing of those patents by parties involved in research and development; and the failure of patent scope limiting doctrines to provide suffi cient freedom of operation for innovators.
If the aim of the Nanotechnology Act is to produce nanotechnology innovation that encourages rapid economic growth, a reassessment of the level of available patent protection for nanotechnology is appropriate, especially in the area of patent infringement defenses for researchers. Part I of this Comment thus provides an overview of the technical aspects behind nanotechnology. Part II examines the similarities between nanotechnology and biotechnology in their respective intellectual property regimes. Part III reviews the problems with the current state of nanotechnology patents.
Finally, Part IV describes a potential solution for promoting increased innovation in nanotechnology through the application of the government license defense in nanotechnology research.
Overview of the Technical Aspects of Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology is not confi ned to a single industry. Rather, it crosses several boundaries of technology including engineering, chemistry, physics, biological sciences, medicine, and optics. Nanotechnology involves the visualization, manipulation, design, and manufacturing of products at the nanometer level. A nanometer is one billionth of a meter, and the nanoscale generally refers to measurements between one and a hundred nanometers [18] . But nanotechnology is more than the study of small things; it is the research and the development of materials, devices, and systems that exhibit physical, chemical, and biological properties that are different from those found at larger scales and that " exhibit extraordinary properties with revolutionary applications " [19] .
The basic science at the nanoscale is not new. Scientists have known that matter is made of atoms for over a century, and for decades they have known how to describe many of the properties of matter. However, only recently have developments in instrumentation and computing made atomic-level measurements possible. The ability to measure, manipulate, simulate, and visualize matter at the atomic scale has the potential of redefi ning our interaction with the world around us -prompting some to consider nanotechnology as revolutionary rather than just another step in technological progress [20] .
Nanotechnology is a young fi eld that focuses on two categories: basic research and materials science products. In 2003, the United States had approximately 104 nanotechnology research institutions and 430 nanotechnology startups producing commercial products [21] . Basic nanotechnology research undertaken in U.S. research institutions, including universities, public laboratories, and private laboratories, primarily focuses on areas such as chemistry, physics, computer science, and biology. The fi rst successful wave of commercial nanotechnology products has been in materials science. Materials science companies are producing innovative products in areas such as coatings, powders and particulates, nanoengineered chemicals, carbon nanotubes, clays, and biomedical devices [22] . The commercial viability of more complex technologies like ultraeffi cient batteries or molecular computer chips historically has been limited by the materials used to make them. However, " with ' building block ' materials being assembled at smaller and more stable levels, near-term developments in nanotechnology should enable remarkable advances in " many signifi cant areas of manufacturing [23] .
Nanotechnology already is generating such varied technologies as stronger and lighter building materials, more durable coatings, effi cient batteries and fuel cells, improved television display technology, and microscopic computer chips. Someday, nanotechnology is expected to enable environmental cleaning mechanisms for air and water, as well as injectable biosensors to detect the presence of infectious agents [24] . At present, medical researchers are actively exploring nanotechnology potential in drugs, drug delivery, diagnostics, devices, gene therapy, and tissue engineering [25] . To date, gene therapy and biotechnology already attempt to manipulate living mechanisms to reconfi gure molecules at the nanoscale. However, these processes are limited by natural mechanisms; for example, although bacteria can be used to reconfi gure molecules at the nanoscale to produce certain proteins, they cannot likewise be used to manipulate molecules in order to produce inorganic diamonds [26] . Nanotechnology, conversely, presents the opportunity to go beyond what natural mechanisms currently allow by creating assembly systems that can build virtually any molecule from elemental atoms.
Future applications of nanotechnology likely will focus on the complex task of automatically manipulating individual atoms and molecules to build gears, motors, and moleculesized machinery [27] . Once this " molecular manufacturing " is ready for commercial application, it will reverse a fundamental basis of traditional manufacturing. Historically, manufacturing has been a top-down process, essentially taking larger materials and cutting and shaping them down into product parts. Molecular manufacturing, on the other hand, starts with the building blocks of atoms and molecules and combines them to form objects from the bottom up -an approach used by nature for billions of years [28] . Eventually this approach may replace many of today ' s production processes.
Although the potential for nanotechnology is promising, at present nanotechnology is still much more of a nanoscience than a producer of commercial nanoproducts. Going forward, in order to foster the continuing innovation that is vital to achieving its technical and economic potential, nanotechnology must develop within an intellectual property regime that fosters an appropriate balance between maintaining freedom of operation for a large number of innovators, while at the same time rewarding innovations with exclusive patent rights.
A Comparison With the Biotechnology Intellectual Property Regime
In several respects, nanotechnology appears to be following the model of biotechnology patent policy. The current " patent land rush " by nanotechnology patent prospectors in many ways mimics the biotechnology experience of the early 1980s [29] . As with nanotechnology today, biotechnology involved considerable scientifi c research funded by the government in several universities and labs. Many biotechnology startups developed out of " broad university patents or groups of patents that were licensed to startups following an initial round of venture capital funding [30] . " Like nanotechnology now, biotechnology held the promise for a new generation of revolutionary products and treatments in the 1980s. However, twenty years later, the promise of biotechnology potential remains only a promise; the general market perception is that biotechnology still offers more " potential " than product. Although several signifi cant biotechnology innovations have proven themselves on the market [31] , the pace of the introduction of new biotechnology products and innovations remains far below initial expectations. Arguably, this shortfall in biotechnology innovation is the result of biotechnology anticommons [32] .
Two events in 1980 provided the spark for the biotechnology anticommons: the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act [33] , and the granting of the fi rst U.S. patent on a genetically modifi ed life form in Diamond v. Chakrabarty [34] . The Bayh-Dole Act, which is discussed in more detail in Part V of this Comment, for the fi rst time allowed universities and small business entities to obtain exclusive intellectual property ownership rights in government-sponsored research. In response to the Bayh-Dole Act, universities and professors quickly patented many aspects of fundamental biotechnology. Lacking signifi cant expertise and prior art in biotechnology, the understaffed USPTO soon began to approve and issue broad and overlapping biotechnology patents to the universities [35] . Professors and researchers subsequently began to leave the universities to found biotechnology startups, and they licensed the biotechnology patents from the universities that held them. Finding that Congress intended to " include anything under the sun that is made by man " as patentable subject matter [36] , the Court in Chakrabarty enabled these early startup fi rms to attract venture capital fi nancing by providing some measure of certainty that biotechnological inventions could be patented.
Seeking to profi t from their patents, universities also began using reach-through license agreements to capture returns from future technological developments based on their patented work [37] . A reach-through license agreement basically gives the owner of a patent, used in upstream stages of research, rights in subsequent downstream discoveries. Such rights may take the form of a royalty on sales that result from use of the upstream research tool, an exclusive or nonexclusive license on future discoveries, or an option to acquire such a license [38] . Because the granting of a singular license was rarely suffi cient in conducting the further incremental research necessary to further develop biotechnology applications, other innovators and researchers were required to acquire numerous licenses held by the universities, many of which either were already licensed to certain biotechnology startup fi rms pursuant to exclusive licenses or were subject to onerous reach-through license agreements.
The complexity of the licensing arrangements with the universities, and the concomitant transaction costs, eventually escalated to the point that biotechnology innovation was hampered. Although it is diffi cult to quantify the effect of an anticommons -because delays and outright failures in licensing are not tracked publicly -there is evidence that a biotechnology anticommons exists. Notably, a study conducted by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group on Research Tools determined that " many scientists and institutions involved in biomedical research are frustrated by growing diffi culties and delays in negotiating the terms of access to research tools " ; that " case by case negotiations for permission to use research tools and materials create signifi cant administrative burdens that delay research " ; that " some users of biomedical research tools have limited resources for paying up-front fees, although their use of the tools could potentially yield valuable future discoveries " ; and that " license mechanisms by which tool providers seek to profi t from the future discoveries of tool users often involve future royalty obligations or rights to future intellectual property that constrain future opportunities for research funding and technology transfer [39] . " Indeed, the chief scientifi c offi cer at BristolMyers Squibb stated that " his company was not able to work on more than fi fty proteins that could potentially be involved in cancer " because the patent holders either would not allow it or were demanding unreasonable royalties [40] . ' " Another pharmaceutical executive complained that his company has frustration internally because we can ' t do what we consider basic research with a cloned gene just using it to make another discovery. At the end of the day, you are cut off from tools, from making a breakthrough discovery. In a number of cases, we can ' t work with this protein or this gene and it slows things down [41] .
Outside the pharmaceutical industry, academic scientists report similar problems of access to important biotechnologies in their agricultural research; some owners refuse to grant licenses " because they mistrust licensees [or] wish to retain a fi eld of research for themselves [42] . " Given the similarity between nanotechnology and biotechnology, it is likely that continued innovation in nanotechnology will face analogous impediments if numerous and potentially overlapping nanotechnology patent rights are granted and exclusively licensed. Realistically, the traditional concept of a single, strong nanotechnology patent capturing the fi nal value of a product is fairly remote at this early stage of fundamental research. Rather, the early stages of successful nanotechnology innovation are more likely to depend on the cross-pollination of many patents tying together many inventions [43] . Thus, in order to foster a more innovative environment in nanotechnology, the U.S. patent and licensing system needs to be examined and changed to avoid the innovation-retarding effects of a nanotechnology patent thicket.
Problems with the Current State of U.S. Nanotechnology Patents
Various challenges face the nanotechnology fi eld as it establishes its intellectual property regime. This Comment focuses on fundamental nanotechnology research conducted in universities and funded by the U.S. government [44] . From this perspective, there is a distinct set of issues relating to the prosecution and licensing of patents in an academic and a legal environment.
The USPTO Is Not Adequately Prepared to
Handle Nanotechnology Patent Applications As described in the introduction of this Comment, the rate of nanotechnology patent applications and patent issuances is increasing. The USPTO patent grant rate for the entire pool of applications is approximately 52 percent per year, and the likelihood of a single, diligently prosecuted patent being granted over the course of the years it is reviewed at the USPTO may be as high as 97 percent (taking into account continuing patent applications) [45] . " Since the acceptance rates for the European, German and Japanese Patent Offi ces are substantially lower, some patent experts claim that [the high U.S. grant rate] indicates a less rigorous examination at the USPTO [46] . " In the long term, the USPTO may shape its policies and performance more consistently with foreign patent practices in response to international intellectual property harmonization efforts, but in the near term, the differences between the USPTO and foreign patent offi ces [47] are particularly important in light of the considerable global market potential of nanotechnology and the worldwide efforts in nanotechnology research and invention. Today, the threat of poor U.S. nanotechnology patent quality can be attributed to a number of problems at the USPTO.
For example, given the multidisciplinary nature of nanotechnology, it is unclear whether the USPTO can handle the anticipated increases in nanotechnology patent applications, especially in regional patent offi ces where examiners are gene rally assigned to examine a single class or related classes of technology. [50] . Although the USPTO ' s effort is underway, the specifi c patents being classifi ed into nanotechnology subgroups are not yet available to the public or to examiners [51] . As it stands, the USPTO designates ten classes as potentially containing prior art for nanoproducts [52] . A potential problem with the lack of a unique classifi cation for nanotechnology-specifi c prior art to date is that examiners likely have encountered a diffi cult time locating the best available prior art for nanotechnology patent applications. Specialized examiners are unlikely to be familiar with advances in other areas necessary for a complete examination of nanotechnology. In addition, industry experts fear that the convergence of fi elds using different terminologies for the same classifi cation " increases the chance that patents will be issued without proper narrowing of the scope of claims in view of prior work and publications, or in view of the practical diffi culties in applying the technology [53] . " Notably, one term in chemistry compared to another in physics or materials science for the same phenomenon can create potential hidden links in prior art that go unnoticed by examiners. Furthermore, nanotechnology patent prosecutors must exercise increased diligence in their role as lexicographers because there are no effective " dictionaries " to interpret nanotechnology claim construction. For example, in U.S. Patent 6,500,622, the patentees created and used the term " quantum dot " in describing their invention when the invention ' s generic name, " semiconductor nanocrystal, " was already in existence [54] . Although it has undertaken affi rmative efforts to educate its patent examiners in nanotechnology [55], the USPTO must put its nanotechnology digest into practice as soon as possible to put U.S. patent quality on par with foreign efforts [56] . The lack of cross-functional nanotechnology expertise at the USPTO [57], and delays in establishing nanotechnology-specifi c guidelines, may lead to the issuance of overly broad patents by examiners despite the existence of relevant prior art.
Finally, from a substantive standpoint, unique forms of claim rejections on the basis of anticipation, obviousness, and enablement in a nanotechnology context are new to both patent prosecutors and examiners. It is not clear if the level of written disclosure in a nanotechnology patent may need to meet or exceed the relatively high bars set for biotechnology patent claims and specifi cations because, to date, there has been no nanotechnology patent infringement litigation that has come to judgment [58] . Patent examiners at the USPTO thus lack appropriate guidelines to help effectively process the multitude of nanotechnology applications being fi led.
The Failure of Voluntary Licensing in a Patent
Thicket To the extent that the USPTO issues a proliferation of broad and potentially overlapping nanotechnology patents, the development of a nanotechnology patent thicket could impede the licensing process required for further innovation. Typically in universities, once fundamental nanotechnology research is ready for patent prosecution and licensing, a technology transfer or intellectual property administration offi ce coordinates the exercise of university patent rights [59] . Income from patent licensing as a percentage of total university budgets tops out at 3-5 percent at some university labs, while most universities are in the range of 1-2 percent [60]. Important licensing terms include duration and manner of payment by cash, equity, or royalties, as well as consideration of who bears the responsibility for patent prosecution costs.
Patent licenses tend to be exclusive, nonexclusive, or fi eldof-use exclusive. Most nanotechnology startups seek exclusive licensing because it generally takes longer to develop costly research-intensive nanoproducts, and it is diffi cult to achieve signifi cant sales until fi ve to ten years after the license is granted. In 2003, twelve of fi fteen publicly announced nano technology intellectual property license agreements were exclusive, with such universities as MIT and NYU selling exclusive commercialization rights to individual companies Traditionally, market incentives tend to lead patentees to exploit their innovations effi ciently, often by licensing them to others in the fi eld. Licensing facilitates patent policy goals by allowing the public to benefi t from the commercialization of inventions and by encouraging incremental innovation by licensees and others who purchase licensed products. Occasionally, strategic bargaining can lead to an impasse where one side overestimates and the other underestimates the value of an invention. Sometimes there is diffi culty in determining if the negotiator ' s assessment is being used as a bargaining tool or in good faith, and there are always uncertainties surrounding patent license development success and profi tability. In spite of these impediments, however, traditional licensing tends to work effectively overall. Yet when a patent thicket develops, traditional assumptions may prove invalid.
First, if rights necessary to develop nanotechnology are held by numerous patentees pursuant to broad, overlapping patents, the transaction costs for a licensee to accumulate all the required licenses needed to enable production may become prohibitive. With the confounding number of patents that a researcher can attempt to license, and the corresponding monetary risk of choosing the " wrong " license, innovators waste time and money seeking the " right " license instead of innovating. Furthermore, the risk of liability for punitive damages to licensees of new technologies is increasing: Courts interpreting these early stage deals have imposed a fi duciary duty on licensees, threatening punitive damages of hundreds of millions of dollars in the event of a breach [65] .
Importantly, unlike in other fi elds, nanotechnology patent holders are not likely to coalesce voluntarily in order to form patent pools and circumnavigate these patent thicket licensing problems [66] . First, with billions of dollars of funding from the Nanotechnology Act being funneled into many universities and labs, in conjunction with the privatization of patent rights from the Bayh-Dole Act, many upstream foundational nanotechnology research efforts are being funded -resulting in little perceived need to pool patents. Because exclusivity in patents and licensing potentially can result in such tremendous profi ts, moreover, parties are more likely to keep their patents than consider sharing them in a patent pool. Second, there has been little demonstrated need for pooling with the limited number of transactions and deals that have taken place. Although some universities may demonstrate acumen in making business deals, to date only a few dozen licensing deals exist despite thousands of nanotechnology patents [67], perhaps because many publicly funded institutions have limited resources for absorbing licensing transaction costs and also because they maintain limited competence in fast-paced, market-oriented bargaining. Third, nanotechnology research is multidisciplinary and requires the use of a diverse set of similar or even identical techniques that may be concurrently patented. Thus, researchers specializing in one area are likely to fi nd it diffi cult to compare the values of patents from other branches of science. Finally, much of nanoscience is in its early stages, and the costs and uncertainty relating to licensing unproven technologies in a patent pool rise in conjunction with the uncertainty of the outcome of projects. As researchers and developers explore numerous potential nanotechnologies, hedging bets becomes expensive.
Productive nanotechnology licensing is further hampered by the heterogeneous interests of the negotiating parties. Cognitive biases among researchers tend to make patent holders overestimate the value of their patents and the likelihood of future success. Universities and commercial businesses can have potentially confl icting agendas. Meanwhile, politically accountable government agencies who fund much of the research may want to make technologies widely available at a low price, while private companies seek product monopolies to reward shareholders and to fund future products. Differences between public and private research additionally result in few standard licensing terms, thereby increasing the cost of case-by-case negotiations. These confl icts and complexities are amplifi ed when both private and public funding is mixed to fund university research projects [68] .
Licensing in a patent thicket is diffi cult. Ultimately, the ineffi ciencies stifl e the ability of innovators to use necessary scientifi c techniques and tools in order to continue researching and developing nanoproducts. As licensing diffi culties come to a head, innovators and hopeful licensees must resort to the judicial system to seek a path through the thicket.
The Failure of Judicial Doctrines in Facilitating
Nanotechnology Patent Licensing Unlike the European Patent Offi ce, the USPTO does not provide a post-grant opposition period when parties opposed to a broad or overlapping patent may fi le protests. The only opportunity for innovators to attempt to challenge patents is through litigation. If researchers and product developers decide to use a patented technology or method without securing a license, they must attempt to seek a declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid or wait to be sued for patent infringement.
Innovators seeking potential limitations to the scope of a contested patent may rely on a number of statutory or common law doctrines during an infringement action. A federal district court may hold a patent invalid after a de novo reevaluation of the USPTO ' s decision to grant patent protection for the particular invention. Even if the court does not hold the patent invalid, it will construe the scope of a patent ' s claims through formal Markman hearings, which defi ne and interpret the bounds of the patentee ' s exclusive rights [69] . If a defendant ' s acts are deemed to fall within these bounds, the defendant also may attempt to excuse the infringing activity under the reverse doctrine of equivalents and the experimental use defense. However, as the following sections illustrate, these doctrines have not proved useful to date for nanotechnology.
The Lack of Nanotechnology Infringement Litigation 1.
Results in Few Patent Validity Guidelines
Thousands of nanotechnology patents have been issued and thousands more have entered the application process. However, outside of suits relating to biotechnology at the nanoscale [70], nanoscale measuring instruments [71] , and trade secret-based employments suits [72] , there has been no signifi cant nanotechnology-specifi c infringement litigation reaching judgment in the United States to provide guidelines on the validity of nanotechnology patents [73] . Long lead times for the commercialization of some nanotechnologies will delay challenges to patents, creating business uncertainty and concerns that patents may be invalidated years in the future. Considering the expense of litigation, patent holders have little incentive, and may very well lack standing, to enter early litigation if they cannot identify activity to enjoin and cannot collect any damages. In other words, innovators lacking the resources to litigate patent validity may be forced to attempt to license " bad " patents rather than contest them.
Although the lack of litigation precludes the ability to measure exactly how well each judicial doctrine may be used in the nanotechnology context, each doctrine does have a history of application in other specialties and industries that sheds some light on how they may be applied to nanotechnology. For example, under the reverse doctrine of equivalents, courts may excuse an infringement when the " [infringing] device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim [74] . " Although an infringer may try to use this doctrine as leverage during licensing negotiation, the reverse doctrine of equivalents rarely has been used successfully in court to limit the scope of a valid patent. In fact, the Federal Circuit has never affi rmed a decision fi nding noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents; therefore, the doctrine is unlikely to be useful in nanotechnology litigation [75] . Unlike the reverse doctrine of equivalents, the experimental use defense does have a history of successful application [76] . However, as discussed in Part III.C.2 infra, recent case law indicates that the experimental use defense is becoming less likely to shield innovators from infringement liability.
The Demise of the Experimental Use Defense 2.
Faced with diffi culties in licensing nanotechnology patents, innovators using patented fundamental research techniques may hope to seek refuge in the experimental use defense, which permits experimentation with the patented invention of another [77] . This defense rarely has been necessary, as the cost of litigation makes it unlikely that a plaintiff will pursue an infringement claim against a defendant if there is no immediate commercial threat. Nevertheless, researchers seeking to verify or use patented nanotechnology methods or products for the sake of research alone may attempt to assert an experimental use defense in cases in which seeking licensing was either too confusing or too expensive, or where the request was rejected.
Recent Federal Circuit cases, however, suggest that patent grantees ' " right to exclude is almost absolute and is tempered only by the narrowest of exceptions based on experimental use [78] . " In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.
[79], the Federal Circuit held that the experimental use defense only applied to infringing acts " for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry [80] . " In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.
[81], the Federal Circuit adopted a rule in which the experimental use exception would be inapplicable to any infringing act comprising " the slightest commercial implication [82] . " Finally, in 2002, the Federal Circuit completely emasculated the defense in Madey v. Duke University [83] , holding that the experimental use defense cannot further the alleged infringer ' s legitimate business [84] . In this case, Duke University ' s infringing use of patented laboratory equipment was viewed as falling within the ambit of its " legitimate business objectives, " and the court specifi cally held that the university ' s nonprofi t status was not determinative [85] . Under this standard, all professional labs and virtually all university labs are excluded from the experimental use defense, effectively eliminating the defense in nanotechnology litigation as a practical matter in the United States. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit ' s narrow construction of the experimental use exception appears to be more restrictive than similar doctrines in Europe and Japan, a fact likely to create a disincentive to perform research in the United States [86] .
The lack of an experimental use defense is deeply troubling for nanotechnology innovation. Basic tenets of scientifi c research require the duplication of tests to validate past procedures. If an exclusive licensee of a nanotechnology patent decides to not allow competitors even to repeat a patented fundamental method or technology of nanoscience, then any attempt to validate or even improve upon that patent will result in liability for infringement. Without an experimental use defense, the widely established use of blocking patents [87] , which is encouraged by the patent system to further competition and improvements on existing technologies, would become impracticable. Rather than have initial patent holders rest on the laurels of broad patents, the requirements for patentability allow these improvement patents to exist in order to benefi t the public with better products. Patents are published to provide information to the public, thereby allowing competitors to invent around existing patents or to create improvements to existing patents knowing that they will need to pay a license for the existing patent [88] . Without the experimental use defense, any attempt to create a noninfringing patent or to show why an improvement on a patent is " nonobvious " also is likely to require a willfully infringing act as a comparison point [89] . Under these circumstances, to the extent that there is an abundance of unchallenged, overly broad nanotechnology patents already issued, continued innovation is likely to become stifl ed by the fear of infringing a patent claim. Without an experimental use defense, innovators are stuck in limbo between unintentional infringement, willful infringement, and seeking fundamental patent licenses that already may have been granted exclusively to competitors. In the interest of preserving the incentives to innovate through research, the Supreme Court should review and overturn the restrictive limitations on experimental use exemptions adopted in the Federal Circuit cases. Until this review takes place, the absence of a doctrine permitting some privilege of unlicensed use, while simultaneously protecting patentees ' incentives, will lead to a patent system that may function to thwart thevery innovation that it is intended to promote.
Fortunately, however, the Federal Circuit in Madey left one door open that may be used to protect nanotechnology innovation: the possibility of a " government license defense [90] . " This novel defense to general patent infringement is based on clauses from the Bayh-Dole Act [91] , and it may allow potential infringers to assert third-party benefi ciary rights to practice the patents at issue on the government ' s behalf -based on government rights in the use of allegedly infringing processes and devices in the performance of government-sponsored research.
Application of the Government License Defense in
Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research Congress should alleviate the stifl ing effects of a patent thicket on U.S. funded nanotechnology innovation by codifying a government license defense based on the government license clause of the Bayh-Dole Act [92] . By integrating the essence of the nowdefunct experimental use defense into the context of federally funded research, Congress can relieve restrictions on the advancement of nanotechnology instead of forcing researchers to waste time diverting resources to struggle with the metes and bounds of patent claims before carrying out even simple experiments. The Constitution directs Congress " to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries [93] . " Excessively strong patent protection in the context of nanotechnology impedes the progress of science instead of promoting it. This Comment ' s proposed expansion of the government license defense is based on the traditional recognition that a patent holder ' s right to exclude is not so absolute that courts will always treat noncommercial acts of infringement as wrongful acts [94] . Furthermore, it is consistent with public policy for the public to have a say in how public funds are used. Such an approach fosters innovation rather than stifl es it, and it supports the patent system ' s constitutional mandate while comporting with the reality that the U.S. nanotechnology industry must innovate in order to compete within the global economy.
A. The Bayh-Dole Act and the Government License Defense Before the Bayh-Dole Act took effect in 1981, the patenting of federally funded innovation generally was limited to various governmental agencies that could not exclusively license patents to nongovernmental entities [95] . Instead, publicly funded research was made available to the public either through the use of nonexclusive licensing or as free public domain information [96] . However, in the 1970s few commercial applications were developed from federally funded research, and useful research stagnated within the halls of academia [97] . In response, Congress set out to amend the Patent Act to promote technology transfer from universities and to foster private investment and the development of publicly fi nanced research. The resulting amendments to the Patent Act, as codifi ed in the Bayh-Dole Act, were signed into law in December 1980. The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act was codifi ed in 35 U.S.C. 200: It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or development; to encourage maximum participation of small business fi rms in federally supported research and development efforts; to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofi t organizations, including universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofi t organizations and small business fi rms are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United States by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the Government obtains suffi cient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this area [98] .
The Bayh-Dole Act reversed prior policy by permitting universities and small business entities ( " contractors " ) to retain private intellectual property ownership rights based on government sponsored research [99] . This legislation immediately invigorated the development of biotechnology on a fundamental level, producing patents, licensing revenues, and biotechnology licensees through the 1980s [100] . However, as discussed in Part III, a biotechnology patent anticommons also developed, ultimately slowing the overall pace of innovation in an otherwise promising fi eld by creating a thicket of patent rights on fundamental research techniques and technologies. Yet while the Bayh-Dole Act has served to foster the development of a patent thicket, it also provides the framework for a solution to that very problem.
In exchange for the right of contractors to take private title to patents, funding federal agencies retain two significant rights under the Bayh-Dole Act. First, the federal agency retains march-in rights, which allow it to require the contractor, assignee, or exclusive licensee of a funded patent to grant a reasonable license to a responsible applicant [101] . If the contractor refuses the federal agency ' s request, the agency can grant a license to the applicant itself if " the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention in such fi eld of use " or if " action is necessary to meet requirements for public use specifi ed by Federal regulations and such requirements are not reasonably satisfi ed by the contractor, assignee, or licensees [102] . " Theoretically, the march-in right demonstrates the power of the government to prevent the nonuse of patents in the context of patent hoarding or blocking patents used to stifl e competition. However, the march-in right never has been exercised by the U.S. government in the twenty-four-year history of the Bayh-Dole Act [103] . The typical refusal by a federal agency to exercise its march-in rights is based on the government ' s view that exclusive licensees are taking effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject patent irrespective of the probability of success or delay in application of those steps [104] . From a practical standpoint, it is unlikely that innovators can infl uence federal agencies to march in on licensing disputes ex ante, and therefore nanotechnology advocates need to seek an alternate approach for promoting innovation above a patent thicket.
The second signifi cant right the funding federal agency retains is the government license -a royalty-free license to practice any patented technology funded by the government. The right to a government license for a federally funded invention is set out in 202(c)(4) of the Bayh-Dole Act: Each funding agreement with a small business fi rm or nonprofi t organization shall contain appropriate provisions to effectuate the following:
With respect to any invention in which the contractor elects rights, the Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferrable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the world [105] While it is clear from the above language that federal agencies have a government license to practice funded inventions, there is also room in this language to suggest that the congressional intent behind the Bayh-Dole Act supports a wider range of applicable licensed uses [106] . The phrase " license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States " traditionally has been interpreted -and exercised with little dispute -as it relates to military or space program contractors. However, this reading could be augmented to include contractors as defi ned by the Bayh-Dole Act: researchers who, through concurrent funding by the government, are conducting research " on behalf of the United States [107] . " From this interpretation it follows that, under the right circumstances, contractors being funded by the government (through such laws as the Nanotechnology Act) should be able to practice governmentally funded, fundamental nanotechnology patents. Although the government license has been in operation as a part of the Patent Act since the Bayh-Dole Act ' s inception over two decades ago, it rarely has been mentioned in any litigation. The exception is Madey v. Duke University, which left the government license defense open for further interpretation [108] . Given the Federal Circuit ' s recent willingness to uphold the government ' s exercise of its rights to privatized patents held by contractors [109] , this more expansive interpretation of a government license defense to privatized patent infringement merits further examination.
By interpreting the government license as a broad defense against infringement for federally funded nanotechnology research, courts will further " promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or development " and " ensure that inventions made by nonprofi t organizations and small business fi rms are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery [110] . " Yet this interpretation of the government license need not be so radical as to presume that all recipients of government funding have an implicit license to infringe without compensating the patent holder. Infringers, even as fellow contractors of federally funded research, should not share the same rights as the federal agency ' s " nonexclusive, nontransferrable, irrevocable, paid-up license [111] . " Instead, the government license should be made available to defendants in litigation involving federally funded patents in exchange for a compulsory licensing fee.
B. The Government License Defense as a Compulsory Licensing Regime
Compulsory licensing is generally defi ned as the granting of a license by a government to a third party to use intellectual property without the authorization of the intellectual property holder [112] . The intellectual property holder is unable to enjoin the infringer ' s use of the patent, but may receive royalty fees from the infringer. The U.S. Patent Act does not contain a general compulsory licensing section, as the United States generally promotes strong patent protection rights both domestically and abroad. However, although the concept of a general compulsory licensing regime in patent law is likely to meet strong resistance, compulsory licensing is not a completely alien aspect of U.S. law. Certain federal statutory provisions authorize compulsory licensing " for preventing air pollution, public health purposes, government use, atomic energy, aerospace, and national security [113] . " In addition, compulsory licenses can be issued under antitrust laws to remedy anticompetitive practices [114] , and under copyright laws relating to the reproduction and distribution of musical compositions [115] .
A well-formulated government license defense would provide a means for overcoming the innovation-impeding effects of absolute exclusion rights by assessing infringement along a spectrum of use. If a court were to excuse an act of infringement under the government license defense, infringing contractors would have the chance to neutralize infringement liability by paying reasonable royalties [116] . The more commercial the infringement, the higher the royalty payment should be. The more experimental the infringement, such as use for scientifi c validation, the lower the royalty payment should be. Ultimately, the government license defense would satisfy the congressional intent of the Bayh-Dole Act in permitting the use of publicly funded research, free of injunctions, to other federally funded contractors to carry out research on behalf of the United States [117] .
The spectrum of federally funded patent use by contractors can be assessed using a concept similar to the fair use doctrine of copyright. Although no fair use doctrine currently exists for patent infringement, Professor Maureen O ' Rourke describes a system that could be used by a court to assess practically the amount of the royalty to pay under a proposed compulsory licensing regime [118] . " The copyright doctrine of fair use arose in part, and is justifi ed, as a mechanism to overcome market failures that would otherwise prevent socially desirable uses of the protected work from occurring [119] . " The fair use defense is " a long-standing equitable doctrine that fi ne-tunes the scope of a copyright over time [120] . " In proposing an extension of fair use principles in patent law, O ' Rourke describes fi ve factors relevant to a fair use fi nding: (i) the nature of the advance represented by the infringement; (ii) the purpose of the infringing use; (iii) the nature and strength of the market failure that prevents a license from being concluded; (iv) the impact of the use on the patentee ' s incentives and overall social welfare; and (v) the nature of the patented work [121] .
In addition to these factors, an assessment of how well the infringing use aligns with the goals of the Bayh-Dole Actas set out in the text and legislative history of the Act [122] should be conducted before determining the reasonable level of a royalty to pay the patentee when a court fi nds that the government license defense applies.
The practical application of such a proposed government license defense, coupled with a compulsory licensing mechanism, is further suggested by the text of the Bayh-Dole Act. Under 202(c)(5), federal agencies retain the right to periodic reporting on utilization and efforts at obtaining utilization by the researcher and his licensees [123] . This right gives the government a means to monitor how effective funded patent holders are in making efforts to license nanotechnology to others. Section 202(c)(6) further provides clear notice to any potential patent licensee of the status of the government ' s license by requiring that a contractor ' s patent specifi cation include an express statement indicating that the invention was made with government support, and that the government has certain rights in the invention [124] . In cases involving nonprofi t organization contractors, 202(c)(7) already provides detailed and specifi c instructions on royalty percentage distributions and uses of the royalties in supporting additional research [125] . This approach could be expanded to include instructions on calculating reasonable royalties among contractors.
Furthermore, the existing government license text of 202(c)(4) of the Bayh-Dole Act states that " the funding agreement may provide for such additional rights as necessary for meeting the obligations of the United States under any treaty, international agreement ... or similar arrangement [126] . " Given the significant level of international interest in nanotechnology, as evidenced by research and development funding as well as world market estimates, special attention to U.S. obligations to current and future international treaties relating to nanotechnology may have an impact on what the government is already authorized to " provide for ... [as far as] additional rights [127] . " In some countries, compulsory licensing of patents is allowed in such circumstances as when a patent is not being worked, when a dependent patent is being blocked, or when the patent relates to food or medicine [128] . In the area of patents, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement already permits World Trade Organization members to grant compulsory patent licenses under the limited circumstances of national emergency, antitrust violations, and public noncommercial use [129] . Future intellectual property harmonization or nanotechnology treaties could also expand existing government license rights. Other countries have little cause to object to this proposed augmentation of the government license defense because there is no impact on foreign intellectual property. The proposed changes only apply to domestic, federally funded research patents with title rights that, under the Bayh-Dole Act, the U.S. government has elected to give to contractors under certain conditions. This proposal merely adjusts those conditions.
C. Application of the Government License Defense to the Nanotechnology Act
The Nanotechnology Act effectively institutionalizes nanotechnology research at the federal level by requiring $ 3.7 billion in funding between 2005 and 2008 for research and development leading to potential breakthroughs in areas such as materials, manufacturing, electronics, medicine, biotechnology, environmental management, energy, chemicals, agriculture, and information technology [130] . In particular, the Nanotechnology Act calls for the funding of federal agencies including the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) [131] . The legislation also requires the creation of research centers, education and training efforts, studies into the societal and ethical consequences of nanotechnology, and activities directed toward transferring technology into the marketplace. With nearly 47 percent of the funding, the NSF receives the most money from the Nanotechnology Act [132] , totaling over $ 1.7 billion over the next four years [133] . NSF funding is already earmarked for university research centers [134] , and several universities have leveraged groundbreaking discoveries and obtained government funding and private contributions to set up centers to promote multidisciplinary research in nanotechnology. These university-based nanotechnology research centers are in a prime position to secure bids for signifi cant shares of the new funding from the Nanotechnology Act; ultimately, they should have an augmented government license defense in order to carry out incremental and innovative research effectively without becoming unduly encumbered by a nanotechnology patent thicket.
The government license defense could be implemented by amending the Nanotechnology Act to state clearly that, under 202(c)(4) of the Bayh-Dole Act, all contractors are deemed to be conducting research " on behalf of the United States " and are therefore authorized to use a government license defense in litigation arising out of infringement of other contractors ' patents under the Nanotechnology Act. Although existing patent holders may complain that the expansion of the government license defense unduly impacts their rights, the defense is double edged: Any intellectual property rights secured under government sponsorship would be subject to the same defense to infringement by others [135] . Further, since the Nanotechnology Act goes into effect for funding in 2005, it is unlikely that any funded inventors have already fi led or established patents from Nanotechnology Act-funded research. All researchers can begin on equal terms.
Conclusions
The application of nanotechnology has exciting prospects for people throughout the world, both in the near term and for many years to come. In light of the infl ux of funding from the Nanotechnology Act, contractors should be able to make many useful inventions. The importance of securing, maintaining, and leveraging nanotechnology patents has been recognized by nanotechnology innovators, but this protection also can impede innovation by creating a patent thicket. Too many overlapping, broad, and ill-conceived patents in the hands of a multitude of exclusive rights holders will deter future inventions. With the demise of the experimental use defense and the escalation in infringement damages, researchers using Nanotechnology Act funding need an augmented government license defense to help bring nanoproducts to market within reasonable time frames. For situations in which innovators are able to identify the particular patents they may be infringing, voluntary licensing of funded patents should, and still will, take place. In fact, the threat of a compulsory license or fair use royalty may inspire parties to come to a direct agreement from the outset. But when licensing attempts fail and the government continues to refuse to exercise its march-in rights, or when researchers unknowingly have infringed a claim from some obscure or overlapping patent, the government license defense will provide a fair and reasonable alternative to research and development stagnation.
[9] In order to secure a patent, the invention must be " any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof ... . " 35 U.S.C.
(2000).
[10] One might take the position that the use of the term " nano " to identify nanotechnology-specifi c patents is not ideal because the term shows up in measurements in other fi elds, such as nanometers and nanomoles in materials science and chemistry. However, these patents are still indicative of the growing presence and importance of nanotechnology because they deal with methods or structures at the nanoscale. The use of this proxy, while unfortunate, is still necessary due to the lack of a publicly available nanotechnology classifi cation system in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Offi ce (USPTO). See infra Part III.A. Notably, use of the term " nano " has shown geometric growth in recent years, much like other terms used as proxies to track nanotechnology-related patents, such as " dendrimer, " " AFM, " " atomic force microscope, " and " quantum dot. ), available at http:// faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf (stating that patent thickets impose " an unnecessary drag on innovation by enabling multiple-rights owners to " tax ' new products, processes, and business methods, " and asserting that a " vast number of patents ... being issued in a particular fi eld creates a very real danger that a single product or service will infringe on many patents, " resulting in a holdup of innovation through royalties and injunctions against new products).
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